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Summary
Thomas Hobbes’s theory of war is currently being re-examined as part of a 
re-examination of realism in international relations theory which claims to be 
Hobbes-based. I am not alone in maintaining that Hobbes was first and fore-
most a peace theorist, rejecting the usual grounds for war, pretexts based on 
just war, infringements on property or trade, and thus trespass. But those who 
examine the three-fold causes of war that Hobbes gives, as “competition”, 
“diffidence”, and “glory”, have generally not noticed the relation between 
Hobbes’s theory of war and empire. While Hobbes makes remarkably few re-
ferences to the colonial ventures of Great Britain, for reasons that we will con-
sider, his theory of empire, like his theory of war, is based on classical notions 
of internal balance and the homeostasis of the body politic along Aristotelian 
lines. His treatment of the polity as a natural body is consistent with his mate-
rialist ontology and he treats war and empire in terms of both “intestine disea-
ses” and pathologies that afflict the body politic from without. The upshot is a 
theory remarkably backward-looking in terms of its emphasis on the health of 
the body politic and the politics of balance, which forbid “vain-glorious wars” 
and demand that overly-powerful subjects, towns of “immoderate greatness” 
and grandiose enlargements of dominion be excised, like Aristotle’s “big foot” 
whose disproportion spoils the proportion of the body as a whole.
Keywords: Hobbes, War and Peace, Empire, International Relations, Realism, 
Bobbitt
1. Hobbes and the Realists on War and Peace
Realism in international relations theory takes from Hobbes its basic postulate that 
order obtains within states as a product of some version of the Social Contract, but 
that between states the international system, without a sovereign or the possibility 
of world government, is necessarily in a state of anarchy.1 The further realist pos-
1 For standard works on realism, see the early classic, Morgenthau, 1992; Waltz, 2000; Mears-
heimer, 2004; Nye, 2004.
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tulate, that anarchy entails competition, conflict and disincentives for cooperation, 
to the point where the international system, like the state of nature before the social 
contract, is prone to perpetual war, is also Hobbesian. But what above all differenti-
ates Hobbes from the realists is that Hobbes is a theorist of peace rather than war.2 
They are further differentiated by the considerable slippage in the realist position 
between facts and values. What in the case of Hobbes is presented as a set of ana-
lytic propositions that constitutes a thought experiment about the origins of govern-
ment becomes in the case of realist international relations theorists a series of postu-
lates for which empirical support is claimed, and from which they derive normative 
recommendations that generally do not favour peace, but rather war. This was true 
in the most extreme form of the advocates of the Bush Doctrine, and particularly 
Philip Bobbitt, instrumental in formulating it, who slipped from the empirical claim 
that new world orders are created as the outcome of epochal wars, by victors who 
impose on the vanquished their own norms and institutions, to the normative claim 
that the right of the victor entails a duty to impose one’s values and institutions 
on the vanquished (Bobbitt, 2002). Of course nothing like this is to be found in 
Hobbes who, like Grotius before him, exhibited a new behaviouralism in the treat-
ment of war (see Springborg, 2010a). Departing from the “just war” tradition of the 
much reviled Aristotelians, and surrounded by the religious wars in which the secu-
lar state suffered its birth pangs, both sought principles that would minimize war, 
which they viewed, not like Clausewitz, as “the continuation of politics by other 
means” but, like Machiavelli, as the failure of politics. 
Recent work has shown that the case of the realists to be Hobbist is flawed 
(Malcolm, 2002: 440-448). But rarely do critics focus on the simple and overriding 
fact that the dissimilarity between the realists in international relations theory and 
Hobbes arises from their most basic postulates. Realists assume the Hobbesian state 
of nature to represent the original state of humankind, rather than an analytic recon-
struction of the conditions for state-creation, and for this reason they see the state of 
nature to be constituted by bellicose primitives, interest-seekers on whom no moral 
constraints are operative because none is yet instated. Hobbes’s famed characteriza-
tion of life in the state of nature as “nasty, brutish, and short” (Lev., xiii, §9, 61/76), 
in its full elaboration in Leviathan would seem to lend support to such a view, but 
not on a close reading. Were it the case that human beings were congenitally belli-
cose, Hobbes’s project would be a lost cause. Hobbes’s account of war is behaviour-
al because it is descriptive rather than normative, but what it describes is an excep-
tional and not a normal state. Nor is it intended to describe the primitive condition 
2 See Delphine Thivet’s excellent “Thomas Hobbes: a Philosopher of War or Peace?” (2008), to 
which I am greatly indebted. See also Bernard Gert’s Hobbes: Prince of Peace (2010), reviewed 
by Michael Funk Deckard (2011).
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of human kind, although Rousseau, who was certainly influential in the reception 
of Hobbes, read him this way. War is a Behemoth, like the “allegorical monster, 
dozing for a tract of time, but without being dead for all that, preventing the angel 
of peace from being revived”.3 Hobbes, maintaining that “during the time men live 
without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is 
called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man” (ibid.: §8, 61/76), 
nevertheless followed Grotius in insisting that war is a “status”, a condition with 
well-defined parameters, “a state which may exist even while its operations are not 
continued”.4 War as a status is also an exceptional state, having a tempus or a time 
dimension, but a bounded time. Foreswearing Aristotle’s famous analogy that “one 
swallow”, any more than one fine day, “does not make a summer”,5 Hobbes intro-
duced a parallel analogy that captured the core of his argument:
For WAR consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time 
wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known. And therefore, the no-
tion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weath-
er. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an 
inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of war consisteth not in 
actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no 
assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE. (ibid.)
Although embedded in a rights doctrine, Hobbes’s concept of war is not strictly 
juridical, any more than that of Grotius; but nor does he subscribe to the “just war” 
tradition, to which Grotius subscribed in a qualified way. By focusing on a “disposi-
tion to war” as the defining characteristic of the “state of war”, he shifts the analysis 
to human psychological predispositions to war that are the very opposite of those 
that characterize the normal condition of peace. Hobbes sees these psychological 
predispositions as, first, “the will to contend” induced by fear of death and the will 
to self-preservation given the perceived anthropological facts about competition 
– life-preserving and death instincts that are in constant competition. Second, and 
not unrelated, is the disposition to “diffidence”, or mistrust. And third, “glory”, or 
the desire for self-esteem. What is new about this account is less its psychologi-
cal and anthropological substance – also to be found in the anthropologies of the 
ancients, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Sceptics and Epicureans – but more the way that 
Hobbes systematizes it in accordance with the materialist principles of the New Sci-
ence of his day, and specifically William Harvey’s theory of the circulation of the 
3 Haggenmacher, 1983: 459-460, Thivet’s translation, 2008: 703. 
4 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, bk 3, ch. 21, §1, 592, Thivet’s translation, 2008: 702.
5 “One swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, 
does not make a man blessed and happy.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.1098a18.
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blood.6 For how these psychological predispositions played out in war Hobbes was 
also deeply indebted to Thucydides, whom he had translated, and whose “semi-
otics of war” (Thivet’s term) comprised a “world-turned-upside-down” such that 
even words changed meaning, charged with the hostility of each man toward “the 
other”.7 In such a time “where every man is enemy to every man”, there is no soci-
ety and no security to furnish its benefits: 
there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and conse-
quently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and 
removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, 
no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, con-
tinual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short. (ibid.: §9, 62/76)
No one has outclassed Rousseau’s percipient reading of Hobbes on the well-
springs of war. But both philosophers, few have observed, owe their basic narrative 
of the role of war in the growth of civilization to the ancients, particularly the Sto-
ics and Epicureans, notably the Roman Stoic Seneca’s Ninetieth Letter on Progress 
and the Roman Epicurean Lucretius’ De rerum natura book five.8 Stoic accounts of 
the consequences of the passage from the state of nature to civilization in terms of 
the increasing interdependence of society, and the consequent exacerbation of ten-
6 Harvey’s De Motu Cordis (On the Motion of the Heart and Blood) was published in Frankfurt 
in 1628, designed for rapid circulation at the Frankfurt book fair.
7 See Thucydides, 1989: I, ii-viii, and especially iii, §82: “[t]he received value of names imposed 
for signification of things was changed into arbitrary. For inconsiderate boldness was counted 
true-hearted manliness; provident deliberation, a handsome fear; modesty, the cloak of cowardice; 
to be wise in everything, to be lazy in everything.” Hobbes’s translation of Thucydides (1989) bk 
3, §82, 204-205. In the opening lines of the Historia Ecclesiastica, Hobbes paraphrased the same 
passage from Thucydides on the power of war to corrupt discourse, manners and morals:
Don’t you see that the whole order of things is being altered? That what was once a crime, they 
now call upright?
Don’t you see that treachery, slaughter, perjury, theft and pillage are called the acts of a good 
citizen?
See Hobbes’s Historia Ecclesiastica (2008), lines 9-12, 304-305 and notes (citations to the 
Historia Ecclesiastica which follow are to this edition).
8 For an elaboration of this thesis, see Springborg, 1981, chapters 2 and 3, and Cole, 1967; based 
on the German tradition of Kulturgeschichte, the term used by Cole and a long line of German 
classicists to characterize the account of the origins of civilization by Stoics, Sceptics and Epicu-
reans, who postulated the interlocking developments of needs-driven technology and constant-
ly expanding mental horizons involved in satisfying them. See also Uxkull-Gyllenband, 1924; 
Jelenko, 1936; and Walter von Spoerri’s important works, “Über die Quellen des Kulturentste-
hung des Tzetzes” (1957) and Späthellenistische Berichte über Welt, Kultur und Götter (1959).
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dencies to competition to the point where an intensification of the status and honour 
stakes leads to war, are faithfully replicated by both philosophers, by Rousseau in 
the Second Discourse, On the Origins of Inequality, and by Hobbes, whom Rous-
seau had so carefully read, in all his works and especially in Leviathan. Hobbes, 
nevertheless, made a special contribution to the classical Epicurean theory of war as 
the product of the interdependency of society accompanying economic and social 
development, and the intensification of competition once the satisfaction of basic 
needs allowed the growth of symbolic needs, simultaneous with the development 
of resources to satisfy them. And that was to systematize the way in which the three 
psychological well-springs of war give rise to three categorically different kinds 
of war: first, the “war of necessity” based on the human propensity to compete for 
goods perceived as scarce; second, preventive war based on “diffidence” or mistrust; 
and third, offensive war based on “vain glory” and perceived threats to or transgres-
sions against the majestas of a hegemon. All three psychological well-springs of war 
are susceptible to manipulation by players who stand to gain from the hostilities and, 
therefore, in Hobbes’s view, there are severe limitations on wars, ranked in terms 
of decreasing legitimacy, that may be rightly waged under their aegis. In the case 
of the first type, “war of necessity”, the uneven geographical distribution of natural 
resources necessary for survival prompts both a pacific and an aggressive solution: 
by means of trade, in the first place; or, failing that, by means of conquest and war. 
Hobbes subscribed to the theory of “goods naturally to be enjoyed in common”, en-
dorsed over centuries by the Church Fathers, and more recently debated by the late 
Scholastics in the context of conquest of the New World: “that such things as cannot 
be divided be enjoyed in common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, 
without stint; otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right” (Lev., 
xv, §25, 78/97). Where enjoyment in common was not feasible, and enclosure of the 
land and private property were necessary, Hobbes insisted that conquest and colo-
nization must not allow the dispossession or extermination of the local inhabitants: 
The multitude of poor (and yet strong) people still increasing, they are to be trans-
planted into countries not sufficiently inhabited, where, nevertheless, they are not 
to exterminate those they find there but constrain them to inhabit closer together, 
and not range a great deal of ground to snatch what they find, but to court each 
little plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season. (Lev., 
xxx, §19, 181/228-229)
Only “when all the world is overcharged with inhabitants, then the last remedy 
of all is war, which provideth for every man, by victory or death” (ibid.: 181/229). 
Like his mentor Francis Bacon before him, Hobbes advocated free trade as a solu-
tion to the problem of scarcity superior to war, while also acknowledging that trade 
relations, as systems of preferential treatment, can themselves be the cause of war:
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It is also a law of nature, that men allow commerce and traffic indifferently to one 
another. For he that alloweth that to one man, which he denieth to another, decla-
reth his hatred to him, to whom he denieth; and to declare hatred is war. And upon 
this title was grounded the Great War between the Athenians and the Peloponne-
sians. For would the Athenians have condescended to suffer the Megareans, their 
neighbours, to traffic in their ports and markets, that war had not begun. (Hobbes, 
The Elements of Law, xvi, §12)
In the case of the second type of war, “preventive war”, resulting from “diffi-
dence” (metus), or fear, Hobbes is consistent in distinguishing between objective and 
subjective assessments of insecurity, the latter subject to manipulation by those who 
stood to profit from the escalation of hostility by a growth in imperium. Although 
acknowledging that humans are so constituted that mistrust or diffidence provokes 
“anticipation, that is by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so 
long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him”, it is the escalation 
of unbounded fear by manipulation to which Hobbes insists on setting strict limits:
For not every fear justifies the action it produceth, but the fear only of corporeal 
hurt, which we call bodily fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be de-
livered, but by the action. [...] But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his 
threatenings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing I have time and 
means to demand protection from the sovereign power) is a crime. (Lev., xxvii, 
§20, 155/196) 
If self-defence does not mitigate the crime of murder in individual cases, nor 
does it in the case of mass killing, or war. Hobbes does allow self-defence in the 
restricted case of bodily or physical threat, as belonging to “the right of nature”, 
that is to say the law-exempt behaviour of the state of nature, characterized by the 
“right to all things”. For “As long as a person has no guarantee of security from at-
tack, his primeval Right remains in force to look out for himself in whatever ways 
he will and can, i.e. a Right to all things, or a Right of war” (Hobbes, De Cive, II, 
Ch. V, §1, 69). But once the law of nature (lex naturalis) has been admitted with 
the social contract, and erected by the sovereign in the form of positive law (lex), 
one’s defence, in all but individual cases of physical threat to one’s person, falls to 
the sovereign.9 Nor does Hobbes allow sovereigns unlimited war powers. He makes 
no room, as Thivet points out, “for war as punishment for the violation of rights 
or injury received, as theorized for instance in Grotius’s De Jure Belli ac Pacis” 
9 Lev., xiv, §1-2, 64/79. I owe this insight to Michael Funk Deckard’s unpublished paper, “Hob-
bes on Peace: Anthropology and the Politics of the Sovereign”, 6, citing ibid.: §3, 64/79: “The 
‘right’ to defend oneself ‘consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare,’ but the ‘law, determineth, and 
bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which 
in one and the same matter are inconsistent’”.
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(Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II, Ch. I, §2, 102; see Thivet, 2008: 713); and nor, 
therefore, is he interested in the merits of the case for defensive war against an ag-
gressor. War is typically waged on the pretext of self-defence and subsequently le-
gitimated by the peace treaty that concludes it; and has its analogue in the case of 
conquest, also legitimized de facto. This is simply a behavioural fact about human 
beings, but defensive wars, for all that, are not legitimate. Hobbes fills out the be-
havioural account of how states prepare their defences, establishing “the obedience 
and unity of the subjects”, raising “the means of levying soldiers”, “having money, 
arms, ships, and fortified places” (Hobbes, The Elements of Law, II, Ch. IX, §9); all 
the time insisting that the best defence lies “in the avoiding of unnecessary wars”.10 
Like Machiavelli he believes that armaments are not the answer, the Prince should 
build fortresses in people’s hearts (Machiavelli, Il Principe, Ch. XX, §6).
Hobbes pays greatest attention to the irrational inflation of fear by those who 
stand to gain from it as the source of mass hostilities, and this holds in all three types 
of war. Fear, indeed, is the source of all institutional power to the extent that, on 
the basis of the social contract by which individuals trade obedience for protection, 
institutions claim to offer them solace for their existential fears. Hobbes’s extended 
treatment of religion as rooted in fear, and the purchase that it gave to priests; his 
condemnation of the doctrine of “twin spheres”, that allowed the division of “spi-
ritual” and “temporal” kingdoms, the kingdom of God and the kingdom of man, 
each at war with one another; and his account of the rise of the papacy as an impe-
rial edifice built on the exploitation of fear, all represent ramifications of this thesis. 
All those who owe their power to the manipulation of fear stand equally condemned 
for their “frauds and wicked skills” in preying off the defenceless.11 Thus: “Force 
and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues” (Lev., xiii, §13, 63/78).
Defensive war morphs into offensive war, and the third cause of war, “vain”, 
from “vain glory” as the well-spring of offensive war, is for Hobbes the least legiti-
mate and the most severely condemned: “Of the passions that most frequently are 
the causes of crime, one, is vain glory, or a foolish overrating of their own worth” 
(Lev., xxvii, §13, 154/194). “Vain” wars, waged, “for [such] trifles, as a word, a 
smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their 
10 Cited by Thivet, 2008: 713. And here I agree with Funk’s criticism of Thivet, that she con-
flates self-defence as the means to self-preservation as a “right of nature”, with defensive wars in 
response to aggression, concluding that as “necessary wars” to secure basic needs they are “just 
wars”. In fact Hobbes does not see even wars of self-defence as “just”, because states tend to 
overstate their security needs and good policy means the avoidance of war.
11 Hobbes, 2008: 314-315, lines 109-110. The epigram is from Ovid’s Metamorphoses I.130-1, 
characterizing the Iron Age, a period of brutal war, and appears on the title page of the 1688 
printed edition of Hobbes’s poem, probably selected by the editor, Thomas Rymer, who also pro-
vided the excellent Preface.
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persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profes-
sion, or their name”, are indeed in vain (Lev., xiii, §7, 61/76). They characterize 
self-devouring status-bound societies in which the pursuit of honour begins where 
basic needs end, status having an unlimited capacity to feed off itself, a topos fa-
miliar from the Roman Epicurean Lucretius in his De rerum natura book 5, which 
Rousseau greatly developed in his Essay on the Origins of Inequality. The over-
inflation of ego, redescribed by Rousseau as “amour propre”, negative ego-centric 
love, as opposed to the positive self-regarding “amour-de-soi”, is a perennial source 
of social conflict.12 This type of psychic distortion characterizes aristocratic and 
“dueling” societies. It belongs to a more systematic exploration by Hobbes of the 
way in which human frailties like vanity and fear become pressure points for in-
stitutional manipulation and sources of social conflict that are in fact absent in the 
state of nature, where the struggle is about basic needs, rather characterising society 
after the social contract, and magnified in more refined societies enjoying the closet 
politics of early modern courts.13
Here, too, Hobbes elaborates in a psychologically compelling way a thesis that 
is present only in germ in the Ancients. We find it first in Plato’s Republic, and his 
account in Book 1 of the development from subsistence society to a society that can 
support the good life, and more fully elaborated in his account of the reconstruction 
of society after the Flood, in the Laws. We find it also in the Stoics and Epicure-
ans, for instance in the Stoic Seneca’s Ninetieth Letter on Progress and the Roman 
Epicurean Lucretius’ De rerum natura, to be picked up and further elaborated by 
Rousseau. Hobbes, like Rousseau, the Jansenists, and later Freud, was a Manichae-
an, postulating in humans both life-preserving instincts and death instincts and a 
constant drive to resolve them in the pursuit of peace. He therefore could not con-
cur with international relations realists that the international system is in a state of 
anarchy based on an overriding human predisposition to war. Most likely he would 
condemn them, like the priests, for inducing a permanent state of fear in which hu-
mans then overshoot in their efforts to provide the security, that by overreaching, 
they only succeed in putting forever out of reach. Once again this is an ancient and 
characteristically Epicurean topos, but developed by Hobbes to provide a systemic 
account of the power of social institutions. If fear of death and the void, and its in-
flation by priests, is the power source of institutionalized religion, then glory, and 
its inflation in hierarchical societies devoted to conspicuous display, is the source of 
the most irrational and self-perpetuating jealous struggles. In war both may inter-
sect, and particularly in civil war, the most destructive form of mass conflict, and in 
12 For a development of this thesis, see Springborg, 1981, chapter 3, “Rousseau on Natural and 
Artificial Needs”.
13 See Sharpe, 1983, 1987; Cuddy, 1987; Adamson, 1999; Shephard, 1992; Wootton, 1999.
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the case of the one he lived through, fomented, he believed, by priests, Presbyteri-
ans and “democratical gentlemen” (Hobbes, Behemoth, 39).
2. Hobbes and the Realists on War and Peace 
Modern international relations theory from its very inception has, for various his-
torical reasons, been dominated by Thomas Hobbes, but a vulgarized Hobbes, as 
Noel Malcolm, Delphine Thivet and Bernard Gert have established. Noel Malcolm 
examines the provenance of the stereotypical view of Hobbes as a realist in interna-
tional relations theory, which he locates in Hobbes’s “utter rejection of teleological 
metaphysics, and his strict derivation of the natural laws from the principle of indi-
vidual self-preservation [which] set him far apart from the mainstream of rationalist 
natural law theories” (Malcolm, 2002: 455).14 Malcolm concludes that “unlike the 
Stoic, scholastic, or Lockean versions of natural law, Hobbes’s theory takes no cog-
nizance of the good of mankind as such” (ibid.). Most importantly, Malcolm notes 
that “[t]here can therefore be no equivalent in it [Hobbes’s theory] to Locke’s con-
cept of the ‘executive power of the law of nature’, by virtue of which a third party 
can intervene in other people’s affairs to enforce that which is objectively right” 
(ibid.). It is this latter feature of Hobbes’s theory, which prohibits interventionism, 
and which distinguishes it from that of Locke, on which I now wish to focus.
The dominant realist paradigm of a system of states, internally ordered but in 
a state of anarchy among themselves, is heavily tilted towards materialism, but in 
a non-Hobbesian way. The problem of order in the international system, according 
to the realist model, is solved in terms of a Social Darwinian survival of the fittest, 
determined in terms of brute capacity: the strongest wins, and strength is measured 
in terms of military and economic might. In this way a more or less incidental, 
but nevertheless disturbing feature of Hobbes’s and Locke’s state of nature theory, 
that the struggle of all against all, like the battle between the sexes, is won by the 
stronger, is elevated into a dominant principle. (Both Hobbes and Locke discourse 
at length on the fact that men and women are in principle equal, but that because 
convention has it that women are the weaker sex, men win, and then apply the mo-
del to the state of nature by allowing brute capacity to determine the outcome.15) 
14 See “Hobbbes’s Theory of International Relations” (Malcolm, 2002: 432-456).
15 Both Hobbes and Locke maintained that men and women are free and equal in the state 
of nature and in civil society, and that whatever advantage accrues to the male due to brute 
strength must not translate into domination over his wife. See Hobbes, Lev., xix, §72, 100/126, 
and Locke, The Second Treatise on Government, ch. 7, §82: “The last determination... naturally 
falls to the man’s share, as the abler and the stronger. But this reaching but to the things of their 
common interest and property, leaves the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract 
is her peculiar right, and gives the husband no more power over her life than she has over his.”
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The difference is that for both Hobbes and Locke the resolution of the problem of 
anarchy in the state of nature is a thought experiment based on an appeal to rights 
and reason, and not an exercise in brute capacity. The genius of the social contract 
as a solution to the problem of anarchy that the state of nature poses, and the strong-
ly rhetorical elements involved in the Hobbes-Locke model, simply drop out of the 
realist paradigm and are only now being reinserted by the neo-realists and construc-
tivists in the form of “Soft Power” (see Nye, 2004).
None of this would be of more than academic interest, perhaps, were it not for 
the fact that the realist model of international relations theory and its preoccupation 
with brute capacity has been so dominant in foreign policy, and in many cases, dis-
astrously so. This applies not only in the case of post-WWII Anglophone foreign 
policy, but also to the work of Carl Schmitt, juridical architect of the Third Reich 
and author of the frighteningly brilliant modern Leviathan.16 If the Anglophone 
world contributed to neo-Hobbesian realism a strong current of social Darwinism, 
the Germanic world contributed the theory of von Clausewitz and his famous ad-
age that “War is the continuation of politics by other means”. The upshot was a vul-
garized Hobbes that is in a sense self-defeating. If, as Thrasymachus put the case 
so early in Plato’s Republic, politics is governed by might over right, or as Hobbes 
was later to observe, “Clubs are Trumps” (Of Punishments, in Hobbes, 1971: 140), 
then all of the subtleties of social contract and theorizing about Justice and how to 
operationalize it since Plato are in vain. This vulgarized Hobbes who worships the 
idol of brute capacity seems to dominate modern international relations theory, fre-
quently involving a slippage from fact to value, from empirical observation to re-
commendation. 
One instance of this slippage is Philip Bobbitt’s move in The Shield of Achil-
les (2002) from the observation that victors of epochal wars do in fact establish as 
hegemonic their own goals and values, to the claim that they have the right to do so 
– a claim perhaps derived from Locke’s notion of “the executive power of the law 
of nature”, which allows, if it does not indeed enjoin on the hegemon, the right of 
intervention in the affairs of sovereign nations to enforce “that which is objectively 
right”.17 To this heady mix of high-minded Lockean natural law theory and Machi-
16 Schmitt, 1938/1995, translated as Schmitt, 1996, by George Schwab. On Hobbes and Schmitt, 
see Bredekamp, 1999 and Bredekamp’s book, Thomas Hobbes visuelle Strategien (2006). See 
also Springborg, 2010b republished in Tralau, 2011.
17 Locke, The Second Treatise on Government, ch. 2, §7: 
And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one 
another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all 
mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hands, 
whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree, as may 
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avellian Realpolitik, Bobbitt adds a preoccupation with brute capacity and material-
ist measures of power that are the hallmark of realist international relations theory. 
So for instance he concludes from the Hobbesian thesis that sovereignty obtains 
only within states and that the system without is in a state of anarchy, the Schmittian 
thesis that war is the natural condition of the state. He makes a number of support-
ing claims on the relation between war, the state and strategy based on his primary 
thesis that states exist to make war.18 Niccolò Machiavelli is famous as among the 
first to advance the thesis that all states are founded in violence. But to conclude 
from this that war is the natural condition of states is to commit the genetic fallacy, 
or the argument from origins that slips from an empirical fact about the origin of 
states to the claim that in the nature of things it should be so, from is to ought. Bob-
bitt then goes on to convert Max Weber’s empirical observation that the origin of 
modern states lay in the administrative structures necessary to fund larger armies, 
from a descriptive to a prescriptive thesis (Bobbitt, 2002: xxii, 70). Such slippage 
we never find in Machiavelli, much less Hobbes. Both Machiavelli and Hobbes 
wrote to advance peace, a futile mission were war the natural condition of states.
The corollary of the doomsday thesis that war is the natural condition of states 
is that it falls to the hegemon to manage aggression, and on this conclusion Bobbitt 
advances a number of theses of striking relevance. He observes, with apparent ap-
proval, that Germany and Russia resolved constitutional issues by violence (ibid.: 
25-27) – in Bismarck’s case in order to defeat parliamentarianism, self-government 
and the threat of Revolution. He adopts the Dr. Strangelove position of praising the 
successful Allied strategy of “going to war to stop aggression” (ibid.: 9), and sees 
the string of regional wars in which America has been involved since WWII as exer-
cises in this strategy. Further, he admires Bernard Brodie and the genius of nuclear 
deterrence in producing “a balance of terror” (ibid.: 12) as an important elaboration 
hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this 
world ’be in vain, if there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that 
law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of 
nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of 
perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, 
what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
18 A sample of these assertions includes the following: the state exists to master violence (Bob-
bitt, 2002: 216); the characteristic of the nation state is total war (ibid.); constitutional security is 
secured by violence (ibid.: 16-17); legitimacy must “cloak the violence of the state” (ibid.: 17); 
states are legitimated by war (ibid.: xxii); a state without a strategy for war cannot maintain its 
legitimacy (ibid.: 815); the attachment of parliamentary governments to law rather than violence 
is fatal (ibid.: 28); parliamentary regimes weaken their own legitimacy by failing to act abroad 
(ibid.: 8); Liberal Constitutional regimes can only survive by revolutionizing their militaries 
(ibid.: 812). 
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2018, pp. 9-35
20
of that strategy, going on to enumerate the conditions under which the US will com-
pel others by force (ibid.: 14) – as the right of victor in “the Long War”, that is to 
say the epochal war, as he terms it, that stretched from 1914 to 1989 and established 
American hegemony. 
Paradoxically, Hobbes anticipated what is now referred to as the “security di-
lemma”, or “spiral model”, terms used in international relations theory for the di-
lemma that ensues from the fact that the defenses states put in place to increase their 
own security, by causing other states to act similarly, thereby actually decrease their 
security.19 Realist international relations theorists are prepared to recognize the di-
lemma, but generally without acknowledging that it is a product of the reflexivity 
of their own assumptions. What is axiomatic in realist theory, that the international 
system is necessarily a state of anarchy, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. More-
over, instead of seeing the “security dilemma” as the product of contradictions in-
ternal to the theory, realists present it as a set of empirical facts, from which nor-
mative recommendations are then derived. Nor are the normative recommenda-
tions usually in terms of the dismantling of the arms race, but rather typically urge 
its intensification in the hopes of gaining an advantage, either in the form of “first 
strike”, or technological superiority. So the implications of the dilemma are not seen 
to be its own falsification. Even neo-realists and constructivist international rela-
tions theorists do not yet see the “security dilemma” as symptomatic of the circular-
ity of the realist position (Wendt, 1992, 1999).
This circularity is present in Hobbes as well, but it does not damn his theory 
in the same way. Fear in the Hobbesian state of nature, as in the anarchic world of 
international relations of the realists, causes people to arm themselves to the teeth, 
but these very measures to combat fear in fact raise the security stakes, and so a vi-
cious cycle of fear, and security measures leading to greater fear, ensues. So, Hob-
bes argues:
every man, especially those that are over-provident [overly-prudent] are in the 
estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus (which, interpreted, is the 
prudent man) was bound to the hill of Caucasus (a place of large prospect where 
an eagle, feeding on his liver, devoured in the day as much as was repaired in the 
night), so that man which looks too far before him, in the care of his future time, 
hath his heart all the day long gnawed on by fear of death, poverty or other calam-
ity, and has no repose, nor pause in his anxiety, but in sleep. (Lev., xii, §5, 52/64) 
Hobbes takes a further step that the security dilemma theorists do not take, and 
that is to argue that the climate of fear produces psychic distortion. For, “fear in the 
19 The term was coined by John H. Herz in Political Realism and Political Idealism (1951). See 
also Jervis, 1976, 1978; and Roe, 1999. 
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absence of causes” leads humans to overshoot in the explanation of these causes, 
postulating “invisible powers” that empower others to enslave them. It is this fear, 
and specifically fear of death, that motivates humans to authorize a sovereign to end 
the “war of all against all” in the state of nature by erecting government. Fear also 
empowers religion, its structures and edifices whereby a future world of happiness 
is hoped to compensate the misery and insecurity in this world. And, in the interna-
tional system, where anarchy still reigns, it also empowers empire and hegemonic 
structures that are monuments to vain-glory with all the ideological trappings of re-
ligion. Vain-glorious power reached its apogee, in Hobbes’s estimation, in the power 
of the Pope, affecting the title of the High Priest of Imperial Rome, pontifex, and 
commanding his world like an oriental despot, with a nod and much foot-kissing: 
The glory of the Roman Pontiff was once immense, he trampled Royal necks with 
his feet.20
Countless kings used to await his commands and he used to wage wars with the 
help of these tame kings.
People trembled at his thunderbolts21 as if they were Jupiter’s, planting fawning 
kisses on his holy feet.22
Every wind blew riches to him, the chill East wind, the African wind, the West 
wind and the North. 
Immovable, he kept everything in balance with a nod that commanded reverence;23 
he had nothing to bother about except to keep his mouth open. (Hobbes, His-
toria Ecclesiastica, lines 2186-2194, 573-575)
3. Hobbes on Colonialism and Imperialism
If Hobbes, the patron of realism, was not a warrior, he was not an imperialist either. 
Although carefully attuned to the nexus between imperium and dominium (see Cole-
man, 1985), Hobbes saw the Americas primarily as “empty lands”, into which “the 
multitude of poor (and yet strong) people still increasing... are to be transplanted” 
20 Legend has it that Pope Alexander III trod upon the neck of Frederick Barbarossa to humiliate 
him; a story repeated by John Milton in his Tetrachordon: Expositions upon the four chief Places 
in Scripture which treat of Marriage or Nullities in Marriage (1645).
21 Also a term for powerful commands – see thunderbolts as the insignia of papal power in the 
frontispiece to Hobbes’s Leviathan.
22 Audiences with the Pope, for all but sovereign princes, required kissing the cross on his right 
shoe – see the reference to kissing the Pope’s toe, in Hobbes, Historia Ecclesiastica, line 2224. 
23 Reference to Jupiter’s nod, which ratifies his decision and makes Olympus tremble: Aeneid 
9.106 from Iliad 1.528-530. The idea of the Pope balancing the world with a nod may also refer 
back to Archimedes balancing the globe, Plutarch, Life of Marcellus (1965: 99).
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(Lev., xxx, §19, 181/228), when resources run out at home. Hobbes advanced a 
proto-Malthusian, proto-“Little-England” policy that put emphasis on work and 
productivity which, by raising the standard of living, was likely to cause both an 
increase in population and a shortage of natural resources. It required those “as 
have strong bodies... be forced to work; and to avoid the excuse of not finding 
employment, there ought to be such laws as may encourage all manner of arts; as 
navigation, agriculture, fishing, and all manner of manufacture that requires labour” 
(ibid.). Like Bacon he operationalized the slogan “knowledge is power” to har-
ness the New Science to the conquest of nature and the provision of a commodious 
existence, but unlike Bacon he did not glory in imperial conquest. After all, he was 
writing in the lead up to, and then the wake of, the regicide, not a very optimistic pe-
riod for British imperialists, unlike his French colleagues, who basked in the glory 
of their “Sun King”. By the time he came to write Leviathan, the short-lived Vir-
ginia Company, founded by James I in 1606 as a joint stock corporation to handle 
the settlement of Virginia, and to which Hobbes belonged as one of the most active 
members, attending at least 37 meetings,24 had already failed, largely as a conse-
quence of the Jamestown Massacre of 1622 where native Americans had exacted 
cruel revenge on the Virginian colonists for their expropriations. As a consequence 
the increasing non-profitability of the Virginia Company caused the British govern-
ment to revoke its charter in 1624, at which point Virginia became a Crown colony. 
In the very few remarks that Hobbes makes about America, we see the legacy of 
the Indian massacre perhaps in his pessimistic account of race relations and inaccu-
rate claims about “the savage people in many places of America”, whom he claims 
“have no government at all, and live at this day in that brutish manner” he had al-
ready described as the war of all against all of the state of nature, “where there were 
no common power to fear”, warning his readers that this was “the manner of life 
which men that have formerly lived under a peaceful government use to degenerate 
into, in a civil war” (Lev., xiii, §11, 62/77).
A generational gap into which the Jamestown Massacre falls, accounts in great 
part for the much greater presence of America in the work of Locke compared with 
that of Hobbes, who was nevertheless not lacking in interest in imperial structures, 
but more preoccupied with those of Spain and the Papacy than the British colonies. 
Just as a generation forward Locke was an American enthusiast, so a generation 
back, Francis Bacon, whom Hobbes served as an amanuensis and translator, was 
also a great enthusiast of empire, having been active in promoting British colonies 
in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Newfoundland, where James I granted him land. But 
24 See Malcolm, 1981, reprinted in his Aspects of Hobbes (2002: 53-79). For an extended analy-
sis of the impact of the Virginia Company on Hobbes’s theory of war, economics and empire, 
see Springborg, 2015.
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generational differences alone cannot account for Hobbes’s attitude to empire. The 
moderateness that we find in his treatment of war forbids imperial enthusiasm as it 
forbids all forms of vain-glorying. Like the ancients, Hobbes sees commonwealths 
as bodies that have bios, whose shape is rise, maturation and decline. Like human 
bodies they procreate and disport themselves abroad, exposing themselves to all 
the vicissitudes of over-extension that threaten to hasten their demise. His position 
once again reflects the conservatism of the ancients, whose fear of premature cor-
ruption of the body politic due to imperial overstretch and excess led them to cau-
tion against foreign entanglements and, in the case of Plato and Aristotle, even to 
ban foreign trade and commerce. 
There is a parsimonious elegance in the way in which Hobbes conceives the 
body politic to work, on the age-old analogy of the natural body. If monarchs are 
their heads, ministers for public and economic administration are their arms (Lev., 
xxiii, §3-4, 123-124/156), while colonies are their natural children: 
The procreation (or children) of a commonwealth are those we call plantations 
or colonies, which are numbers of men sent out from the commonwealth, under a 
conductor or governor, to inhabit a foreign country, either formerly void of inha-
bitants or made void then by war. (Lev., xxiv, §14, 131/164)
Colonies may “remain united to their metropolis, as were the colonies of the 
people of Rome, and then they are no commonwealths themselves, but provinces 
and parts of the commonwealth that sent them” (ibid.: 131/164-165). But Hobbes 
cautions that, like natural children, colonies should normally grow up to become 
free, independent commonwealths in their own right, “discharged of their subjec-
tion to their sovereign that sent them (as hath been done by many commonwealths 
of ancient time), in which case the commonwealth from which they went was called 
their metropolis, or mother, and requires no more of them than fathers require of 
the children whom they emancipate and make free from their domestic government 
(which is honour and friendship)” (ibid.: 131/164).
In treating the causes of the “Dissolution of a Commonwealth” in chapter xxix, 
Hobbes faithfully pursues the comparison to natural bodies which, more than an 
analogy, represents rather the consistent application of his materialism under the 
rubric that “every part of the universe is body, and that which is not body is no part 
of the universe”.25 Bodies may perish from “intestine diseases”, as they may perish 
from intestine (internal) war, “in the first place those that arise from an imperfect in-
stitution, and resemble the diseases of a natural body which proceed from defectu-
ous [defective] procreation” (Lev., xxix, §2, 167/210). Again following the ancients 
25 Lev. xlvi, §15, 371/459. A rule that also forced him to insist on a Corporeal God, see Spring-
borg, 2012.
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and Machiavelli, Hobbes lists among the “infirmities” of a commonwealth internal 
constitution, first, and sedition, second (ibid.: §6, 168/212). He extends the ambit 
of sedition, entirely consistent with the classical doctrine of civil religion, third, to 
cover doctrines that interpose individual conscience against sovereign command, or 
use “supernatural inspiration” as a pretext for resistance, and the “supernaturally 
inspired” as judges of good and evil (ibid.: §8, 169-170/212). Hobbes departs from 
Aristotle, if not from Plato or Machiavelli, in seeing a fourth cause of the death of 
kingdoms the rule allowing that “the sovereign power is subject to the civil laws”; 
but does not depart from the classical authors in the fifth cause, “[t]hat every private 
man has an absolute propriety in his goods, such as excludeth the right of the so-
vereign” (ibid.: §§9, 10, 170/213). But he does depart from the ancients in the sixth 
cause, the doctrine that “the sovereign power may be divided” (ibid.: §12, 170/213), 
and this represents his repost to Lord Clarendon whose support of “mixture” or the 
classical doctrine of the mixed constitution, subscribed to by Polybius and Machi-
avelli in the Discorsi (although not in Il Principe), caused Hobbes to break with his 
old friend.
On divided sovereignty as the cause of the continual disturbances and “sedi-
tions of the aristocratical and democratical factions” of the Greek city states (ibid.: 
§13, 170/214), Hobbes follows Machiavelli, who in The Prince saw it as a cause of 
the corruption of Italia. And it is in this context that Hobbes excoriates those classi-
cal Greek and Roman writers who, in recommending divided sovereignty or, worse, 
popular government, secreted a venom like that of a rabid dog:
he that is bitten... is in such an estate as if the poison endeavoured to convert 
him into a dog, so when a monarchy is once bitten to the quick by those demo-
cratical writers that continually snarl at the estate, it wanteth nothing more than 
a strong monarch, which nevertheless out of a certain tyrannophobia (or fear of 
being strongly governed), when they have him, they abhor. (ibid.: §14, 171/215)
“Mixed monarchy”, or sovereignty divided between king, lords and commons, 
Hobbes sees as a fallacy perpetrated in his own day on the model of the Trinity. “In 
the kingdom of God there may be three persons independent, without breach of 
the unity of God that reigneth; but where men reign, that be subject to diversity of 
opinions, it cannot be so”; a kingdom in which king, lords and commons all bear 
the person of the people, or a part of the people, “are not one person, nor one sove-
reign, but three persons and three sovereigns” (ibid.: §16, 172/217). In the Historia 
Ecclesiastica (lines 751-752, 392-393) he is even bolder, claiming that since “the 
Greek word for substance is ‘hypostasis’; one who says there are three hypostases 
says there are three Gods”.
So Hobbes convicts those parliamentarians who make the case for king, lords, 
and commons as sovereign of the same absurdity as those who support the doc-
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trine of the three persons of God in the Trinity, adding the provocation of his own 
unorthodox doctrine, which claims that God has as many persons as often as he is 
personated. And he does it while railing at the “spiritual” doctrines of the Scholas-
tics, as “a disease which not unfitly might be compared to the epilepsy, or falling 
sickness (which the Jews took to be one kind of possession by spirits) in the body 
natural”, which takes the form of “an unnatural spirit (or wind) in the head that ob-
structeth the roots of the nerves and, moving them violently taketh away the motion 
which naturally they should have from the power of the soul in the brain, and there-
by causeth violent and irregular motions (which men call convulsions)” (Lev., xxix, 
§15, 172/216). For “as he that is seized therewith falleth down... so also in the body 
politic, where the spiritual power moveth the members of a commonwealth (by the 
terror of punishment and hope of rewards, which are the nerves of it) otherwise than 
by the civil power (which is the soul of the commonwealth)” (ibid.).
Mixarchy, or “mixed monarchy”, “is not government” at all, according to Hob-
bes, “but division of the commonwealth into three factions”, and a pathology caused 
in the body politic where “there be more than one soul, as when the power of levying 
money (which is the nutritive faculty) has depended on a general assembly, the power 
of conduct and command (which is the motive faculty) on one man, and the power 
of making laws (which is the rational faculty) on the accidental consent, not only of 
those two, but also of a third” (ibid.: §16, 172/216). Thus, “when... these two pow-
ers [church and state] oppose one another, the commonwealth cannot but be in great 
danger of civil war and dissolution”. Mixarchy, and worse, a commonwealth divided 
between church and state, are the ultimate infirmities caused by a false constitution, 
which defeat Hobbes in terms of “natural diseases”. Rather they are gross deformi-
ties, like to the image he confesses to “hav[ing] seen [of] a man that had another man 
growing out of his side, with an head, arms, breast, and stomach of his own”; in the 
case of mixarchy, he adds: “if he had had another man growing out of his other side, 
the comparison might then have been exact” (ibid.: §17, 172/217)!
4. Hobbes on Money, Commodities, Commerce, Commonwealth 
and Volatility
C. B. MacPherson’s audacious book, The Political Theory of Possessive Individu-
alism: Hobbes to Locke (1962) has long fallen out of favour. But in truth, without 
having to concede that Hobbes is the author of a theory of possessive individual-
ism, we can concede that, in the tradition of Aristotle’s economics and that of the 
late Scholastics, he developed a rudimentary theory of capital, commodities, com-
merce, and financial volatility that foresaw economic development, population ex-
pansion, colonial adventurism, the possibility that the tail can wag the dog, and that 
colonies can undo the imperial mother country because of the dynamics of imperial 
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over-extension. It is true that he expresses his arguments in the registers of medieval 
and Renaissance notions of internal balance and the homeostasis of the body poli-
tic favoured by the medical sciences of his day. Having “named such diseases of a 
commonwealth that are of the greatest and most present danger”, and these gross 
deformities, Hobbes turns from “intestine diseases” to infirmities that are interme-
diate between those that afflict the body politic from within and those that afflict 
it from without, like “Want of Money”, and specifically, “the difficulty of raising 
money, especially in the approach of war” (Lev., xxix, §18, 172/217). Money as 
at once the measure of value and at the same time stored-up commodities – twin 
features which constitute the vulnerability of coinage to depreciation and volati-
lity – is the life-blood of the commonwealth, and as its circulation is essential to 
health, so its obstruction can cause the demise of the body politic. Hobbes follows 
Aristotle in seeing that the “expansion of dominion” is an occupational hazard for 
commonwealths, due to the fact that money as a measure of value is vulnerable to 
the vicissitudes of any general measure of exchange, so that a reserve currency can 
be devalued at home due to financial volatility abroad.26 Familiar to us from Marx, 
Hobbes undoubtedly took his theory of money, like Marx, from Aristotle’s Nicoma-
chean Ethics book 5 and late scholastic commentaries. But he builds his argument 
on the very specific anthropology that he has already set out in human psychologi-
cal predispositions already discussed, and in terms of the passions. If “glorying” is 
an excellence that tends to excess in the form of “vain-glorying” – and here he di-
verges from Aristotle, who praises the grandness of the megalopsuchos (Aristotle, 
Nichomachean Ethics, 4.3), as Machiavelli also praises magnificence – this frailty 
in individuals is writ large in states. 
Excess and disequilibrium are systemic due also to the facts of economic in-
sufficiency: that commodities are perishable, that their value must therefore be sub-
stituted by money, and by resort to trade and commerce to provide need-satisfiers. 
“The Nourishment of a Commonwealth consisteth in the Commodities of Land and 
Sea” (Lev., xxiv, §1, 127/159), he declares, and these commodities are “partly na-
tive and partly foreign: native, that which is to be had within the territory of the 
commonwealth, foreign, that which is imported from without” (ibid.). Moreover, 
“because there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth (except 
it be of very vast extent) that produceth all things needful for the maintenance and 
motion of the whole body”, commonwealths make up the deficit “by importation of 
that which may be had abroad, either by exchange, or by just war, or by labour; for 
26 Hobbes notes “that coin which is not considerable for the matter, but for the stamp of the 
place, being unable to endure change of air, hath its effects at home only, where also it is subject 
to the change of laws, and thereby to have the value diminished, to the prejudice many times of 
those that have it” (Lev., xxiv, §12, 130/164). 
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a man’s labour also is a commodity exchangeable for benefit, as well as any other 
thing” (ibid.: §4, 127/160). Hobbes observes, perhaps with reference to Britain and 
certainly with respect to Greece, that some commonwealths with small territories 
have successfully “increased their power, partly by the labour of trading from one 
place to another, and partly by selling the manufactures whereof the materials were 
brought in from other places” (ibid.). But once again overstretch is always a danger 
because of the exogenous power of money. If “[t]he Nutrition of a commonwealth 
consisteth in the plenty and distribution of materials conducing to life; in concoc-
tion (or preparation); and (when concocted) in the conveyance of it, by conveni-
ent conduits, to the public use” (ibid.: §1, 127/159), it follows that “Money [is] the 
Blood of a commonwealth”, because “concoction” means “the reducing of all com-
modities which are not presently consumed, but reserved for nourishment in time 
to come, to some thing of equal value, and so portable as not to hinder the motion 
of men from place to place... And this is nothing else but gold, silver, and money” 
(ibid.: §11, 129/163).
For gold and silver, being (as it happens) almost in all countries of the world 
highly valued, is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between 
nations; and money (of what matter soever coined by the sovereign of a common-
wealth) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the subjects 
of that commonwealth. By the means of which measures all commodities, move-
able and immoveable, are made to accompany a man to all places of his resort, 
within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from 
man to man within the commonwealth, and goes round about, nourishing (as it 
passeth) every part thereof, in so much as this concoction is, as it were, the san-
guification of the commonwealth; for natural blood is in like manner made of the 
fruits of the earth, and circulating, nourisheth by the way every member of the 
body of man. (ibid.: 130/163-164)
Gold and silver are monarchs in their own right, they “have the privilege to 
make commonwealths move, and stretch out their arms, when need it is, into fo-
reign countries, and supply not only private subjects that travel, but also whole ar-
mies with provision” (ibid.: §12, 130/164). Hobbes appears to have the Spanish in 
mind who provisioned their armies from the Mexican mine at Mount Potosi.27 Mo-
ney has the power to destabilize states, especially in the case of colonial adventur-
ism, for once commodities have been converted into gold and silver, given “that the 
value of them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few commonwealths, 
as being a common measure of commodities of all places” (ibid.), commonwealths 
become vulnerable to currency volatility – as the Spanish, flooding the internation-
27 Hobbes in the Historia Ecclesiastica actually names Mount Potosi, the most celebrated of the 
Spanish colonial silver mines in the seventeenth century. See Hobbes, 2008: line 2222, 578-579.
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al market with New World silver and creating the notorious Spanish Price Rise of 
Hobbes’s own day, learned to their cost.
If money, as at once the life-blood of the polity, and at the same time a great 
source of vulnerability, increases the threat of somatic invasion from without, it pre-
sents even greater opportunities for pathologies within the body politic. Hobbes cre-
ates a taxonomy of “intestine” diseases, familiar from the catalogues of distempers 
of popular Elizabethan literature (see Harris, 1998). He begins with the opportuni-
ties money creates for well-funded factions and demagogues, a topos also familiar 
from the ancient writers and novel only in the manner in which Hobbes exploits to 
full advantage his knowledge of his associate William Harvey’s theory of the cir-
culation of the blood. Raising first the instance of “money raising for the necessary 
uses of the commonwealth, especially in the approach of war”, Hobbes makes his 
case with clear reference to the Charles I’s Forced Loan of 1626-1627 and the Ship 
Money controversy (see Dzelzainis, 1989), in which he had supported the king, 
commending the royal effort to build a war chest against popular resistance:
From whence it cometh to pass that the sovereign power, which foreseeth the ne-
cessities and dangers of the commonwealth, finding the passage of money to the 
public treasure obstructed by the tenacity of the people, whereas it ought to extend 
itself to encounter and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth itself 
as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by strata-
gems of law, to obtain little sums, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to 
open the way for present supply or perish; and being put often to these extremities, 
at last reduceth the people to their due temper, or else the commonwealth must 
perish. (Lev., xxix, §18, 172/217)
The memory of his own involvement in the Ship Money case seems to reacti-
vate those passions that animated him at the time, prompting from Hobbes one of 
the most extravagant of a series of purple passages in his exposition of the “intes-
tine” pathologies of the body politic, comparable only to his excoriation of the clas-
sical republicans and popular democrats as “mad dogs” of factionalism, and con-
sistent with his somatic theory of the polity as body:
Insomuch as we may compare this distemper very aptly to an ague, wherein, the 
fleshy parts being congealed or by venomous matter obstructed, the veins which 
by their natural course empty themselves into the heart are not (as they ought to 
be) supplied from the arteries; whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contrac-
tion, and trembling of the limbs, and afterwards a hot and strong endeavour of the 
heart to force a passage for blood; and before it can do that, contenteth itself with 
the small refreshments of such things as cool for a time, till (if nature be strong 
enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the 
venom into sweat, or (if nature be too weak) the patient dieth. (ibid.: 173/217-218)
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The “ague” of congestion and congestive heart failure caused by citizen ob-
struction over revenue-raising is complemented by the “pleurisy” caused by trea-
sury outflow being concentrated in the hands of “one or a few private men, by mo-
nopolies or by farms of the private revenues, in the same manner as the blood in a 
pleurisy, getting into the membrane of the breast, breedeth there an inflammation, 
accompanied with a fever and painful stitches” (ibid.: §19, 173/218). Hobbes sees 
this disease as an instance of the general pathology “aris[ing] from the opinion 
that every subject hath of a propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the sove-
reign’s right to the use of the same” (ibid.: §18, 172/217). For specification we need 
only turn to Behemoth, which in treating the civil war treated the challenge leading 
up to the regicide. There Hobbes puts into the mouth of Interlocutor B the claim: 
“we never shall have a lasting peace... [until] the nobility and gentry know that the 
liberty of a state is not an exemption from the laws of their own country, whether 
made by an assembly or by a monarch, but an exemption for the constraint and in-
solence of their neighbours” (Hobbes, Behemoth, 59), or those foreign powers that 
would encroach on national sovereignty weakened by internal factionalism. This is 
the great lesson of Hobbes’s civil science, as “the science of just and unjust”, a de-
monstrable science, accessible to those of even “the meanest capacity” (ibid.: 39; see 
also Springborg, 2003, 2009). It was a lesson that the Rump, who “wanted not wit, 
but the knowledge of the causes and grounds upon which one person has a right to 
govern, and the rest an obligation to obey” (Hobbes, Behemoth, 159-160), had failed 
to learn. In Leviathan “the rules of just and unjust sufficiently demonstrated, and 
from principles evident to the meanest capacity... and notwithstanding the obscurity 
of their author, have shined, not only in this, but also in foreign countries, to men 
of good education” (ibid.: 39), Hobbes boasts, grimly reminding his audience that 
despite the fame of his book abroad, at home “the light of that doctrine has been hi-
therto covered and kept under here by a cloud of adversaries, which no private man’s 
reputation can break through, without the authority of the Universities. But out of the 
Universities, came all those preachers that taught the contrary.” The Universities, he 
concludes, “have been to this nation, as the wooden horse was to the Trojans” (ibid.: 
40), a swipe at the “democratical gentlemen” (ibid.: 39), products of those univer-
sities, who throw around their classical learning and “out of their reading of Tully, 
Seneca, and other anti-monarchics... show their discontent when they are not called 
to the management of the state” (ibid.: 155-156), by obstructing the Crown. 
Hobbes gives no special name to the pathology caused by “the popularity of a 
potent subject” which is nevertheless “a dangerous disease”, along the lines of that 
of factions and, specifically, the “democratical gentlemen”, precisely “because the 
people (which should receive their motion from the authority of the sovereign), by 
the flattery and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their 
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obedience to the laws” (Lev., xxix, §20, 174/218). He takes as his example “Julius 
Caesar, who was set up by the people against the Senate, having won to himself 
the affections of his army, [but] made himself master, both of Senate and people” 
(ibid.). In De Cive Hobbes had taken rather Sallust’s Cataline to illustrate the same 
point. “No one was made more for sedition than Cataline; he is portrayed in Sal-
lust as having adequate eloquence but little wisdom”; and Hobbes pays homage to 
the Roman historian, for: “Sallust separates wisdom from eloquence, attributing the 
latter to him [Cataline] as essential to a born rabble-rouser, denying him wisdom 
because wisdom dictates peace” (Hobbes, On the Citizen, 121). Hobbes the philoso-
pher of peace was himself not lacking in eloquence in concluding of Caesar’s case 
that “this proceeding of popular and ambitious men is plain rebellion, and may be 
resembled to the effects of witchcraft” (Lev., xxix, §20, 174/218).
The “ague” and “pleurisy” caused by individuals or factions, in syphoning off 
resources due to the sovereign, has its analogue in the pathology of “the immoderate 
greatness of a town, when it is able to furnish out of its own circuit, the number and 
expense of a great army” – and here he probably refers to the Scots who defeated 
the King’s army three times, in 1640, in 1646 and in 1648, finally to be defeated 
by Cromwell’s London-based New Model Army in turn. The city of “immoderate 
greatness”, together with “the great number of corporations (incorporated towns), 
which are as it were many lesser commonwealths in the bowels of the greater, [are] 
like worms in the entrails of a natural man” (ibid.). Hobbes this time puts together 
the power of factions with that of the cities which are their hosts, returning to the 
subject of the “democratical gentlemen”, as “pretenders to political prudence”, en-
joying “the liberty of disputing against absolute power... which though bred for 
the most part in the lees (dregs) of the people, yet animated by false doctrines, are 
perpetually meddling with the fundamental laws, to be the molestation of the com-
monwealth, like the little worms, which physicians call ascarides” (ibid.), parasites 
specific to the human intestinal tract that are quite capable of killing the host. When 
the host is dead, due to war or intestinal disease, it is all over and the sovereign as 
the soul of the body, consistent with Hobbes’s mortalism, cannot be revived:
Lastly, when in a war (foreign or intestine) the enemies get a final victory, so as 
(the forces of the commonwealth keeping the field no longer), there is no farther 
protection of subjects in their loyalty, then is the commonwealth DISSOLVED, 
and every man at liberty to protect himself by such courses as his own discretion 
shall suggest unto him. For the sovereign is the public soul, giving life and motion 
to the commonwealth, which expiring, the members are governed by it no more 
than the carcass of a man by his departed (though immortal) soul.28
28 Lev., xxix, §23, 175/218-219. We know that Hobbes denies the soul is immortal, and clearly 
for this reason one’s dead carcass can no longer be governed by it, present or absent.
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What Hobbes gives with one hand he takes with another. Seeming momentari-
ly to endorse a notion of the soul, he nevertheless immediately denies the possibili-
ty of its outliving the body. And this is the “mortalism” that earned him the epithets 
“heretic” and “blasphemer”.29 In fact he is ruthlessly consistent in the application of 
his materialism and the principle that “every part of the universe is body, and that 
which is not body is no part of the universe”.30 Political bodies he treats as natural 
bodies, united in their representatives, which are their heads. But the international 
system as a default category has no extension or mass, and therefore is not a body. 
Precisely because it is not a body as such, there is no organic analogy for it, it is a 
vacuum, or medium which is host to political bodies, ever in motion and never at 
rest, like billiard balls in space. From this later political theorists have extrapolated 
a condition of anarchy, on the analogue of the state of nature. But Hobbes has little 
to say about the international system of states, born only in 1648 with the Treaty of 
Westphalia, beyond the fact that it has no sovereign, and for this reason urging cau-
tion on national bodies not to overextend themselves or offer provocations to wars 
that, in the absence of world government, cannot easily be concluded. Hobbes’s the-
ory of territorial empire as a threat to the longevity of the commonwealth is along 
the same lines of lack of balance leading to disequilibrium that we find in the clas-
sical authors. If “potent subjects” and “the immoderate greatness of a town” consti-
tute threats, so does the grandiose enlargement of dominion, arguments reminiscent 
of Aristotle and his observation that among the causes of revolution are “ambition, 
fear, superiority, contempt, and disproportionate growth” which he likens to the big 
foot whose disproportion spoils the proportion of the whole.31
So with plantations and colonies, fruit of “the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, 
of enlarging dominion”, which expose us to “the incurable wounds thereby many 
times received from the enemy, and the wens (warts), of ununited conquests”, listed 
by Hobbes among the liabilities of vain-glory, “which are many times a burden, and 
with less danger lost than kept”; as belonging with “the lethargy of ease, and con-
sumption of riot and vain expense”, all better expunged than retained (ibid.: §22, 
29 Samuel Mintz in his study of Hobbes’s reception, The Hunting of Leviathan (1962: 45), sum-
marizes the reasons critics gave for calling Hobbes an atheist as follows: “that the universe is 
body, that God is part of the world and therefore body, ... that the members of the Trinity are 
Moses, Jesus, and the Apostles, ... that witchcraft is a myth and heaven a delusion”, and that the 
soul is mortal, dying with the body.
30 Lev., xlvi, §15, 371/459. A rule that also forced him to insist on a Corporeal God, see Spring-
borg, 2012.
31 Aristotle, Politics, Bk V, ch. iii, 1302b: “Political revolutions also spring from a dispropor-
tionate increase in any part of the state. For as a body is made up of many members, and every 
member ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved; but loses its nature if the 
foot be four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans.”
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175/218). Hobbes, the philosopher of peace, is also a minimalist along classical 
lines, eschewing luxury, vain-glory and its customary excesses, vain-glorious war 
and imperial grandstanding. In this respect he is at a far remove from the Elizabe-
than adventurers of the generation immediately previous to his, Drake, Ralegh and 
his mentor Francis Bacon, enthusiasts for the plantation of colonies, whatever he 
may have thought of the law of empire being promulgated by his peers, Hugo Gro-
tius and John Selden; just as he was also at a far remove from John Locke, as yet 
unborn, the Secretary for Plantations. His theory is remarkably backward-looking 
in terms of its emphasis on the health of the body politic, homeostasis and the poli-
tics of balance, forbidding “vain-glorious wars”, overly-powerful subjects, towns 
of “immoderate greatness”, and foreign adventurism leading to grandiose enlarge-
ments of dominion, empire and war.
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